Requirements of a Quantum Key Distribution Reference Platform. JRC Project 867 Quantum Cryptography Study by LEWIS Adam et al.
20 1 5
Adam Lewis, Carlo Ferigato and Lothar Breitenbach 
JRC Project 867 Quantum Cryptography Study 
Requirements of a  
Quantum Key Distribution Reference Platform 
Report EUR 27039 EN 
European Commission 
Joint Research Centre 
Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
Contact information 
Adam M. Lewis 
Address: Joint Research Centre, Via Enrico Fermi 2749, TP 720, 21027 Ispra (VA), Italy 
E-mail: Adam.Lewis@jrc.ec.europa.eu 
Tel.: 39 0332 785786 
JRC Science Hub  https://ec.europa.eu/jrc
This publication is a Technical Report by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. 
Legal Notice 
This publication is a Technical Report by the Joint Research Centre, the European Commission’s in-house science 
service.  It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to the European policy-making process. The scientific 
output expressed does not imply a policy position of the European Commission.Neither the European Commission 
nor any person acting on behalf of the Commission is responsible for the use which might be made of this publication. 
All Images © European Union, 2015 
JRC93769 
EUR 27039 EN 
ISBN 978-92-79-44724-2 
ISSN 1831-9424 
doi:10.2788/76797 
Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2015
© European Union, 2015
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
 Requirements of a Quantum Key Distribution Reference Platform 
 JRC Project 867 Quantum Cryptography Study 
Adam M Lewis, Carlo Ferigato and Lothar Breitenbach 
 Security Technology Assessment Unit 
 Institute for the Protection and Security of the Citizen 
Joint Research Centre 
2014 
Background and Scope 
A document stating requirements for a quantum key distribution (QKD) reference platform was planned as 
one of two deliverables from Project 867 Quantum Cryptography Study in 2014, the other deliverable being a 
feasibility study of JRC developing such a platform. By platform is meant a laboratory, or network of 
laboratories, which will evaluate QKD systems and report the results of the evaluations both publicly and 
privately, as needed. The advantage of separating the requirements and feasibility into different reports in 
this way is that it gives greater clarity as to which is which. The scope of this present report is therefore to 
define the required characteristics of a QKD reference platform which would make it useful for customers, 
manufacturers and policy-makers.  Details, and where it is not immediately obvious, the rationale, are 
explained requirement by requirement. The applications which are at the moment of greatest interest for the 
JRC are also described. 
The following key features of the sector have emerged from our study in 2014: 
1. QKD technology is maturing, a number of start-up companies are offering products and there is also
significant interest from large companies
2. Ambitious plans for QKD networks exist in US (Battelle), Japan (NICT) and China (QuantumCTek)
3. Standards for QKD systems have also already been drafted by an ETSI Industry Specification Group
4. The most important missing element needed for the sector to develop is a broad market.
Nevertheless, there do appear to be some significant challenges before a test and evaluation platform, which 
would offer something useful to users, could be implemented.  
A list of companies may be found at 
http://www.quantiki.org/wiki/Private_sector_quantum_information_science . We are aware of one company 
listed which is no longer active in the field, and one which is active but not listed. Otherwise, the list appears 
to be up to date and comprehensive. 
A recent discussion of the three networks outside Europe mentioned above took place at the 2014 QCRYPT 
conference and may be found on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fzFCOSuotWw . 
The ETSI industry specification group (ISG) on QKD was set up with FP6 funding within the SECOQC (Secure 
Communication based on Quantum Cryptography) Project. It has established the following standards: 
ETSI GS QKD 002 V1.1.1 QKD Use Cases 
ETSI GS QKD 003 V1.1.1 QKD Components and Internal Interfaces 
ETSI GS QKD 004 V1.1.1 QKD Application Interface 
ETSI GS QKD 005 V1.1.1 QKD Security Proofs 
ETSI GS QKD 008 V1.1.1 QKD Module Security Specification 
At the moment, sales of QKD systems appear to be restricted to certain high-end financial systems and 
classified government communications. Further development requires diversifying into new applications. 
The JRC has experience of a number of public sector identity systems where quantum key distribution might 
potentially be applied. The exploratory research project of 2009 identified four, and two more have 
subsequently become apparent. 
General Requirements 
1. Provide objective, independent and scientifically well-grounded evaluations of QKD technologies.
2. Support the standardization process, including as a user of standards
The reference platform should use the ETSI standards as the basis for its assessments. It would be
very unhelpful and confusing to the community to start from scratch with different test methods,
unless clear deficiencies were identified in the existing standards, which has not happened to date as
far as we are aware. Proposals for improvements to the standards emerging from experience
operating the reference platform should be presented to the ETSI ISG.
3. Include both experimental and theoretical aspects in security assessments
QKD security depends on implementation of some QKD protocol, with well-understood security
properties, by means of hardware and software that corresponds faithfully to the assumptions in that
protocol. A reliable assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of any QKD system, or class of
systems, requires a thorough understanding of both the QKD protocol itself and its practical
implementation, as reflected in ETSI GS QKD 005 V1.1.1 QKD Security Proofs and ETSI GS QKD 008
V1.1.1 QKD Module Security Specification. It will be import to keep up-to-date on advances in QKD
components, such as detectors and sources.
4. Conduct security assessments using up-to-date knowledge about vulnerabilities
New vulnerabilities in QKD systems are discovered at approximately one per year. Some examples are
the photon-number splitting attack, the detector blinding attack and exploitation of detector dead
time. Any security assessment which fails to take into account the latest developments is worthless. It
is essential to liaise closely with researchers, the so-called “quantum hackers”, to stay up to date.
5. Assess QKD systems for use in specific applications
At minimum this would involve analysis of the integration of QKD with the existing cryptographic
systems used in context. This aspect is probably the most overlooked and the one that is critical to the
adoption of the technology. Users of sophisticated information security technology are usually obliged
to be conservative and can adopt new technologies only when they can be incorporated into existing
systems with minimal risk and disruption.  A complete evaluation for a specific application would also
include a cost-benefit analysis.
6. Cover (ideally all) different transmission paths and contexts
These are fibre optic and free space; for fibre, lit fibre and dark fibre, for free-space, terrestrial,
airborne and satellite, and both static and mobile platforms.
7. Cover (ideally all) different modes and protocols of QKD
These are single-photon and continuous wave, polarization-modulated and phase-modulated, non-
entanglement based and entanglement-based, device-dependent, device-independent and partially
device-independent protocols.
8. Practise responsible disclosure of any security vulnerabilities detected
Companies must be allowed an opportunity to address any flaws in existing systems, without exposing
the owners of installed systems to additional risk. Moreover, unless this policy is adopted, it will be
impossible to obtain the full cooperation of manufacturers in evaluations. Consequently, the
evaluation platform should not always make its findings public immediately but should do so with
discretion, according to a well-defined procedure.
9. Be operated according to a formal quality system
Ideally, the platform would be independently accredited by a recognized accreditation body.
10. Respond positively to improvements proposed by users
  
European Public-Sector Applications 
 
In the exploratory project of 2009, four applications were considered: 
 
Vessel Monitoring System and e-logbook for maritime applications 
The single most important feature for this application is the requirement for free-space QKD for ship-
to-shore or ship-to-satellite communications. The exploratory project also pointed out that there 
might be some contexts on large vessels where fibre optic QKD could be used inside a vessel.  
 
Peer-to-peer network with traffic light protocol 
The traffic light protocol (see e.g. https://www.us-cert.gov/tlp ) is a set of designations used to ensure 
that sensitive information is shared with the correct audience. Information to be shared is labelled red 
(only amongst those party to the specific exchange), amber (only amongst individuals who need to 
know, within involved organizations), green (only within a defined community) or white (public). 
For example, information exchange within the JRC-managed European Reference Network for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (ERNCIP) uses the TLP. The exploratory project hypothesized the case 
where there was a central “Trusted Agent Node” through which parties communicated, so that the 
distance limit on current QKD systems might not be severe restriction, a trusted node being present 
anyway. 
 
The European Commission’s confidential communications 
TESTA (Trans European Services for Telematics between Administrations) is a communication 
platform to exchange electronic data between European and Member States administrations in a 
secure, reliable and efficient way, based on a private wide area network, originally fully isolated from 
the public internet.  The current implementation, called sTESTA (s for secure) is in the process of 
being migrated to its successor TESTA ng (new generation), which will have enhanced services and 
security and will make use of the public internet for exchanging non-sensitive material. The 
architecture is based on a dedicated backbone called EuroDomain, to which individual administrative 
networks belonging to the Institutions or Member States are connected. It is designed for 
communications classified up to Restreint UE. Encryption is based on IPSEC, which supports triple 
DES and AES symmetric ciphers, but has also been the subject of controversy because of alleged 
insertion of deliberate security vulnerabilities. 
Given the complexity of this network of networks, opportunities for enhancing security by means of 
QKD could exist of several points. The most obvious is within the EuroDomain backbone, but one 
could also imagine QKD being used for connections with the backbone and/or within institutional 
networks. 
 
Reference 
 pieter.wellens@ec.europa.eu 
TESTA NG Testa new generation 2nd International Conference on Cyber Crisis Cooperation and Exercises,  
23-24 Sept 2013, Athens, Greece 
 
Digital Tachograph 
The EU Digital Tachograph system was introduced by Council Regulation 3821/85 as amended by 
Council Regulation 2135/98 and Commission Regulation 1360/2002. The last includes in Annex I(B) - 
Requirements for construction, testing, installation, and inspection - the technical description of the 
digital tachograph system. 
The European Root Certification Authority (ERCA) was designed, implemented and is currently 
operated by the JRC on the Ispra site. Countries receive the symmetric and asymmetric encryption 
keys for use by their Member State Authority via trusted couriers, who come to JRC Ispra for an ERCA 
signing session. These are held, on average, twice a month.  The public keys are then published in the 
ERCA web site. See http://dtc.jrc.ec.europa.eu . 
The idea would be to try to replace this manual key distribution with QKD links. It would be possible 
to implement QKD only for some member states, where it was feasible and the country wanted it.  
Two more applications have subsequently emerged which should be considered for evaluation. 
Certificate distribution for e-passports 
Electronic passports issued by EU member states have the capability of storing an encrypted image of 
the bearer’s fingerprints in an ISO/IEC 14443 radio-frequency identity chip, embedded in the 
passport cover. Since this data is far more security-sensitive than the name, place and date of birth, 
place and date of issue, and photograph visible on the passport’s main page, it is essential to ensure 
that it can be read only by authorised persons using certified equipment. This is achieved by 
encrypting the fingerprint data by elliptic curve cryptography and a suitable public key infrastructure, 
in which certificates are issued to “inspection systems” (=passport reader devices) by the “document 
verifier” (=the organisation responsible for the inspections systems) and the document verifier is 
certified by the “country verifying certification authority” (= the root authority for each member 
state). There is no European level certification authority for passports. 
In many cases, the certification authorities will be physically situated in a major city, within a short 
enough distance of passport issuers and airports to allow direct fibre optic communication without 
repeaters, if such links exist or can be installed. Currently, certificates are distributed from the CVCA’s 
to the DV’s every three days by human courier. Using a secure electronic communications could 
reduce cost and eliminate the risk of physical theft of the certificates from the courier. 
In the case of a DV responsible for a large number of IS’s, for example a large airport, with several 
different passport check points, each with several different readers, quantum key distribution could 
be used to avoid the need to physically bring the certificates to each reader or the possible security 
risk of sending them on an internal network. The threat in this case would consist of a malicious party 
eavesdropping on the internal network. This is arguable the most immediately feasible opportunity 
because the environment is controlled and obtaining or installing dedicated fibre lines would be 
relatively simple. The distances would be short enough e.g. 10’s of km, that no trusted nodes would be 
needed.  
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Proposal for an eIDAS Token 
Regulation (EU) N°910/2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions 
in the internal market (eIDAS Regulation) was adopted by the co-legislators on 23 July 2014, based on 
a proposal in Commission Communication COM(2012) 238 of 4 June 2012. It is considered to be a 
milestone in providing a predictable regulatory environment to enable secure and seamless electronic 
interactions between businesses, citizens and public authorities and so increase the effectiveness of 
public and private online services, eBusiness and electronic commerce in the EU.  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2014.257.01.0073.01.ENG 
BSI and ANSSI, the German and French IT security agencies, together with industry partners, have 
developed a concept for using the machine-readable travel document (MRTD) specification, as used 
for the e-passport, as the model for other applications of electronic identity within the eIDAS 
framework. Details, including a beta-version specification, may be found at 
https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Publications/TechnicalGuidelines/TR03110/BSITR03110-
eIDAS_Token_Specification.html;jsessionid=5BA25305CA0E5DF0954A615751F98627.2_cid359 
Demonstration of quantum key distribution for MRTD’s, as proposed above, would therefore open up 
an opportunity for its application for eIDAS tokens as well.  
Conclusion 
Based on the information gathered during 2014, as well as the experience of the exploratory project of 
2009, ten general requirements for a quantum key distribution platform and six possible public sector 
European applications have been identified.  
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